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Florida v. Riley: The Descent of Fourth
Amendment Protections in Aerial
Surveillance Cases
Introduction
Aerial surveillance is becoming an important law enforcement tool.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, however,
limits law enforcement activity by protecting certain security interests
against government intrusion.' The exclusionary rule makes evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment inadmissible.2
On one hand, the Constitution should be adaptable to changing
times, allowing the, use of advancing technologies in the fight against
crime. Courts generally have been receptive to this idea, provided fourth
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment applies to state governments through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"Probable cause," for fourth amendment purposes, requires only that the facts available
to the officer would cause a person of reasonable caution to believe certain items may be con-
traband or evidence of a crime. It does not demand that the belief be correct or more likely
true than false. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
"Search" is a term of art in fourth amendment terminology. It is defined by BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY 1211 (5th ed. 1979) as:
An examination of a man's house or... premises, or of his person, or of his
vehicle... etc., with a view to the discovery of contraband or... some evidence of
guilt to be used in the prosecution of a criminal action... [against him]. State v.
Woodall, 16 Ohio Misc. 226, 241 N.E.2d 755, 757.... [I]t is not a search to observe
that which is open to view. People v. Carroll, 12 Ill.App.3d 869, 299 N.E.2d 134,
140.... Visual observation which infringes upon a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy constitutes a "search" in the constitutional sense. People v. Harfmann, Colo.
App., 555 P.2d 187, 189.
Within constitutional immunity (Fourth Amendment) from unreasonable
searches and seizures, an examination or inspection without authority of law of
premises or person with view to discovery of stolen, contraband, or illicit property, or
for some evidence of guilt to be used in prosecution of a criminal action. Bush v.
State, 64 Okl.Cr. 161, 77 P.2d 1184, 1187.
2. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). This rule applies to the states by the
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643. The rule has
recently been limited, however, by a "good faith" exception. See United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
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amendment search standards have been met.' On the other hand, aerial
surveillance opens the door to possibly great governmental intrusion into
the outdoor property and activities of every person,4 cutting against the
central protection of personal security in the Fourth Amendment. The
basic judicial question arises whether such surveillance constitutes a
"search" for fourth amendment purposes.'
Historically, a fourth amendment "search" required actual physical
invasion.6 In 1967, the Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States,7 moved
away from the physical invasion requirement and framed a new test:
whether there is a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the particular
area.' If so, the Court found that the Fourth Amendment protects
against any warrantless intrusion into that area, regardless of physical
invasion. 9
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Florida v. Riley, 0 which held
that helicopter surveillance 400 feet over defendant Riley's backyard
greenhouse was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. This deci-
sion followed the trend established by California v. Ciraolo and Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 2 further limiting fourth amendment pro-
tections in aerial surveillance cases. This Comment argues that the
Supreme Court, by misapplying the Katz reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy standard, establishes a test of fourth amendment protections that is
3. For cases upholding the use of such advancing technologies, see United States v.
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (flashlight); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (beeper
monitoring inside house); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (beeper surveillance of
car); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962) (microphone) (issue addressed in dictum with-
out reaching the constitutional question); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (search-
light, marine glass, and field glass); United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1289 (9th Cir.
1980), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981).
4. References to George Orwell's classic novel, 1984, and the fears of "Big Brother
Watching," and the "Police Patrol" are frequently cited by those arguing against allowing
such intrusions. See Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 704-05 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. See supra note 1. Note, however, that the Fourth Amendment does not define actions
that constitute "searches." The courts have thus developed methods for determining if a
search has occurred. See infra notes 14-58 and accompanying text.
6. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). For further discussion, see infra notes 33-38 and accompany-
ing text.
7. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
9. Id at 353, 359; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)) ("[Fourth amendment principles] apply to all inva-
sions on the part of the government and its employ6s of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life.").
10. 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
11. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text for further
discussion.
12. 476 U.S. 227 (1986). See infra notes 78-90" and accompanying text for further
discussion.
too restrictive and is contrary to the goals of personal security protection
embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
This Comment will analyze the historical underpinnings of the Riley
decision. Further, it will discuss the impact of the decision on the future
of aerial surveillance under the Fourth Amendment. Part I analyzes the
evolution and scope of fourth amendment protection. Part II discusses
the history of aerial surveillance under the Fourth Amendment. Parts
III and IV analyze and critique the Riley decision itself, arguing that the
Court, through misapplication of the Katz reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test, severely curtails fourth amendment protection in aerial surveil-
lance cases. Finally, Part V attempts to resolve four questions that will
likely arise as lower courts try to implement the Court's reasoning: 1) Is
the curtilage doctrine13 still valid?; 2) Who will bear the burden of proof
regarding the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy?; 3) Is compli-
ance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations sufficient
to defeat the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy?; and, 4) As
technology continues to improve, has Riley left any limits consistent with
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment on permissible aerial surveil-
lance? This Comment concludes that the Supreme Court has imposed
too stringent a test of fourth amendment privacy expectations, resulting
in foreclosure of previously afforded protections, and that such a narrow
test is unwarranted in view of the underlying policies of the Fourth
Amendment.
I. History of Fourth Amendment Protections
A. Pre-1967: Property Rights and the Trespass Standard
Arbitrary searches and seizures by British officers under "general
warrants" 14 motivated the Framers to include the Fourth Amendment in
the Bill of Rights. The Framers, in drafting the Fourth Amendment,
intended the Amendment to safeguard people's security and privacy
13. See infira notes 22-28 and accompanying text. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (5th
ed. 1979) defines curtilage as:
A piece of ground commonly used with the dwelling house,] ... generally...
used for domestic purposes in the conduct of family affairs,] ... and enjoyed with it,
for its more convenient occupation.
For search and seizure purposes includes those outbuildings which are directly
and intimately connected with the habitation and in proximity thereto and the land
or grounds surrounding the dwelling which are necessary and convenient and habitu-
ally used for family purposes and carrying on domestic employment. State v. Han-
son, 113 N.H. 689, 313 A.2d 730, 732.
14. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 n.21 (1980); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 625 (1886). These "general warrants," or "writs of assistance," gave British officers
complete authority to search for goods imported in violation of tax laws. Payton, 445 U.S. at
583-84 & n.21.
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against these arbitrary governmental invasions."
The English common law developed protections against such inva-
sions based on the property/tort concept of trespass. 16 This idea formed
the original basis of American fourth amendment protection as well.
Under this theory, an individual was protected from warrantless
searches only if 1) a trespass (actual, nonconsensual, physical invasion)17
occurred; and 2) the trespass occurred on a "constitutionally protected
area.,,18 Fourth amendment protections applied only if the search met
both requirements. 19
The American common law automatically protected the home
15. The Fourth Amendment, however, does not specify what constitutes an "unreasona-
ble" search. Nor does it define what constitutes a "search." Since the word "search" is a term
of art for fourth amendment purposes (see supra note 1), it will hereinafter be used to refer to
any observation either requiring a warrant under the Fourth Amendment or exempt by falling
within "some one of a number of well defined 'exigent circumstances."' Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75, 477-78 (1971).
16. Historically, the English common law protected only the home against warrantless
searches and seizures. These protections were extended in Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep.
807, 815-18 (K.B. 1765) to include curtilage and all other real property. As Lord Camden
stated:
[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot
upon his neighbor's close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser... [and] if
he will tread upon his neighbor's ground, he must justify it by law.
Id at 817.
17. The requirement of trespassory invasion was construed strictly. See Silverman v.
United States, 365 U S. 505 (1961) (physical invasion held fourth amendment violation); Olin-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (no fourth amendment violation since no actual
invasion), overruled in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (for further discussion,
see infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942)
(detectaphone placed against wall without penetration held not an invasion and no fourth
amendment violation), overruled in Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (for further discussion, see
infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (con-
sent vitiates trespass, so no fourth amendment violation); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963) (same).
18. "Constitutionally protected area" also was defined narrowly, approximately by the
plain language of the Fourth Amendment (with curtilage included in "houses," as it was at
common law). See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Lopez, 373 U.S. at 427; Lanza v.
New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 505.
19. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (testimony of trespassing police of-
ficers admissible since no search of "person, house, papers, and effects"); United States v. Lee,
274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927).
Thus, spying and eavesdropping were not unlawful, since eyes and ears could not trespass.
Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 807. Followed in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), and
maintained well into the 20th century. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438; Goldman, 316 U.S. at
129.
Further, electronic devices could be used so long as the "device [was] not.., planted by
an unlawful physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area." Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438-39
(citing Silverman, 365 U.S. at 505).
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under the plain language of the Fourth Amendment.2" Any search by
physical invasion was thus unreasonable per se, and required a warrant
"in the absence of some one of a number of well defined 'exigent
circumstances.' 21
Curtilage2 2 was also extended fourth amendment protection,23 for at
common law the curtilage was viewed as intimately related to, or a vir-
tual extension of, the dwelling house,2' and thus deserved the same pro-
tections afforded the dwelling house.2 5 This extension of protection has
come to be known as the "curtilage doctrine."'26
Fourth amendment-protections, however, did not extend beyond the
curtilage of a dwelling into the area known as the "open fields."2 7 The
American common law drew the line of fourth amendment protection at
the border between the curtilage and open fields.2" The Court in Hester
v. United States29 gave virtually unlimited search authority for areas con-
stituting "open fields."130
20. U.S. CoNST.-amend. IV; see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 589 (1980);
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512 (the home is a "constitutionally protected area" under the Fourth
Amendment).
21. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75, 477-78 (1971).
22. See supra note 13.
23. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984).
24. See United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1981).
25. See 4 W. BLACKsFONE, COMMENTARSES *225; Oliver, 466 U.S. at 170 (curtilage re-
ceives same protection as house).
26. For a good discussion of the evolution and history of the curtilage doctrine, see Note,
The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 725 (1985).
27. Dow Chemical .Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986) (quoting Oliver, 466
U.S. at 179):
Open fields [are those areas beyond the curtilage that] do not provide the setting for
those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from
governmental interference or surveillance.
28. Note the difference here between the American common law and the English common
law, which extended protections to all real property. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807,
815-18 (LB. 1765); see supra note 16.
29. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
30. Id The rule in Hester was based on explicit fourth amendment language: "[Persons,
houses, papers, and effects," U.S. CONST. amend. IV, does not include open fields. In fact,
"open fields" are per se unprotected. Hester, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); cf Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-71 (1971); id at 505-06 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); id at
521-22 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). The "open fields" exception is a different princi-
ple from the "plain view" doctrine. The plain view doctrine provides that warrantless seizure
by police of contraband that comes within plain view during lawful searches or other observa-
tion of private areas may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, assuming the discovery
is "inadvertent."
The "inadvertent" requirement means both a lack of advance knowledge of the location of
particular evidence and a lack of intent to seize it by use of the doctrine as a pretext. Texas v.
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The common law, however, has encountered problems in setting
forth a clear test to distinguish curtilage from open fields. Such a test is
critical given the tremendously different fourth amendment treatment af-
forded curtilage as opposed to open fields.31 Many different definitions
have been proffered, but no satisfactory "bright-line" test has emerged."
B. Post-1967: Katz and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In 1967, the landmark decision of Katz v. United States33 shifted the
standards of fourth amendment protection away from strict property
concepts, introducing the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
standard.34
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983) (evidence observed during lawful automobile inspection satis-
fies "inadvertence" requirement).
Probable cause is also required to invoke the plain view doctrine. Arizona v. Hicks, 480
U.S. 321 (1987).
31. See Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945
(N.D. Cal. 1985) (fourth amendment protection not extended to open fields, but curtilage
protected).
32. Blackstone, for example, noted that the existence of a common fence is one way to
measure curtilage. 4 W. BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225. Those areas beyond such a
common fence are thereby defined as open fields. Areas that have been held to be open fields
include: public highways and roads, United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983); farm-
land, Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984); woods behind a home, id at 174. This
test is too simplistic. One wonders how the Blackstone test treats a house with more than one
fence, or perhaps no continuous fence all the way around the house. For example, there are
rarely continuous fences at the end of a driveway (although perhaps a gate), and yet one would
intuitively expect to find the driveway within the curtilage.
More recent cases have recognized the inadequacy of the Blackstone test. In Care v.
United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956), the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated, "Whether the place searched is within the curtilage is to be deter-
mined from the facts, including its proximity or annexation to the dwelling, its inclusion
within the general enclosure surrounding the dwelling, and its use and enjoyment as an adjunct
to the domestic economy of the family." Id at 25. See also, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978).
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987), synthesized prior
cases and set forth four factors for determining whether an area falls within the curtilage:
[1)] [IThe proximity of the area... to the home[;]
[2)] [Whether the area is ... within an enclosure surrounding the home[;]
[3)] [The nature of the uses to which the area is put[;] and
[4)] [IThe steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by
[passersby].
Id at 301.
The court expressly stated that these factors were not a formula that yields the "correct"
answers, but tools to see if an area is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should receive
fourth amendment protection as curtilage. Id.
33. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
34. The origin of Katz's protection of privacy interests as the fourth amendment standard
is arguably seen in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474-78 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting), overruled in Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. Justice Brandeis stressed the need for broad
fourth amendment protection of defendant's privacy interests, stating, "Whenever a telephone
[Vol. 17:725
In Katz, the FBI electronically eavesdropped on defendant as he
used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering information.35
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not
places."36 Therefore, what an individual "seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected."'37 And, "[o]nce this much is acknowledged,... it becomes clear
that the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the pres-
ence or absence of a physical intrusion .... "38
Since Katz "justifiably relied" on the privacy of the phone booth,
the FBI's electronic wiretap and recording of calls was a "search and
seizure" under theFourth Amendment, 39 despite the absence of physical
trespass.40
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard4 1 involves a two-
prong inquiry.4 2 First, an individual must exhibit a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, and second, that expectation must be one that society
views as reasonable.43 Protection under the test requires compliance
line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded and all conversa-
tions between them upon any subject, and although proper, confidential and privileged, may be
overheard." Id at 475-76. Brandeis' opinion shows an early recognition of the necessity, in
fairness to the motives behind the Amendment, of attaching fourth amendment protections to
an individual's privacy expectation, rather than strictly to a property interest.
35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
36. Id. at 351; see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140 (fourth amendment rights are personal in
nature, as opposed to property-based).
37. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
38. Id at 353. By so holding, the court repudiated the common law trespass standard of
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942). Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
39. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
40. Id; see also United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976) (telescopic
observation into apartment violated reasonable expectations of privacy and therefore the
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2nd Cir. 1980) (same).
41. Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz, claimed that in certain areas (unlike open fields as
in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)), each individual "has a constitutionally pro-
tected reasonable expectation of privacy... ." Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
42. The two-part test arose from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion. Id at 361 (Harlan,
J., concurring).
43. Justice Harlan stated:
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a
two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as "reasonable." Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where
he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain
view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself
has been exhibited.
Id
Whether an individual's expectation of privacy is reasonable will be intrinsically related to
his or her behavior on or use of the property. Thus, one who closes off his or her property
from public view reasonably should be able to rely on the public to respect one's privacy, and
that reasonable expectation of privacy receives fourth amendment protection under Katz.
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with both prongs.'
Due to the difficulty in proving state of mind, the first part of the
Katz test-the subjective expectation of privacy-must be manifested
physically. Also, the physical manifestation requirement negates any
theory of "knowing exposure."'45
In aerial surveillance cases, various lower courts are split, imple-
menting two very different approaches to decide what behavior satisfies
the physical manifestation requirement.
The first, a "ground-level" approach, requires protecting an activity
from ground-level surveillance." Thus, a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy may be held reasonable if a party erects walls, fences, or anything
intended to obstruct ground-level observation.47
Other courts implement an "aerial" approach, requiring a party to
shield activities from aerial observation before a subjective expectation of
privacy will be found reasonable.48 This test is harder to meet than the
ground-level test, since a party would, in many cases, be hard pressed to
44. Ia at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court, while continuing to apply the two-
prong test, has since recognized that it would not always be an adequate index of fourth
amendment protection.
For example, if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television
that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereaf-
ter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their
homes .... Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this Na-
tion's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously monitoring his
telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the contents of
his calls might be lacking as well.... [W]here an individual's subjective expectations
had been "conditioned" by influences alien to well-recognized fourth amendment
freedoms, [they] obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the
scope of fourth amendment protection was. [I]n such cases, a normative inquiry
would be proper.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979).
45. That which "a person knowingly exposes to the public... is not a subject of fourth
amendment protection." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (quoting Katz, 389
U.S. at 351); see also James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
46. See Dean v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 116, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 585, 588 (1973) ("Horizontal extensions of the occupant's terrestrial activity form a
more realistic and reliable measure of privacy than the vertical dimension of altitude."); People
v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 710 P.2d 299, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1985) (shielding of yard from
ground-level observation gives reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance). But
cf Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (no reasonable expectation of privacy exists when
inside of automobile visible from ground level).
47. See United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1981) (fences indicate a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy).
48. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 312-13 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd,
476 U.S. 227 (1986) (despite efforts to maintain ground-level privacy, no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy found without guards against aerial surveillance); see also United States v.
DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (planting contraband out of sight from
road did not foreclose all aerial surveillance); United States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512, 514
(E.D. Ky. 1980) (no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance despite efforts
to conceal marijuana from roadside view).
shield its activities from all possible aerial views. The party cannot sat-
isfy the test absent this total shielding.49
A court's finding of a subjective privacy expectation triggers the ob-
jective expectation inquiry of Katz: is the expectation "one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'?"' 0 In other words, is the individ-
ual's privacy expectation, viewed objectively, "justifiable' under the cir-
cumstances?"1 Implementing the objective prong of the Katz test
requires balancing individual privacy rights against society's legitimate
law enforcement interests. 2
In considering the weight of the individual's privacy interest, no sin-
gle factor is conclusive.53 Courts have looked to the following factors:
1) The precautions taken by the person invoking the fourth
amendment protection (Le., were they of the sort. customarily
taken by those seeking privacy); 4
2) The way in which a person uses the location;55
3) The Framers' objections to the intrusion;5 6 and
4) The person's property rights.
These factors suggest that the historic property line tests of the pre-
Katz period have survived as indicators of post-Katz reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy areas.58
49. See United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986); State v. Stachler, 58
Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977). Contra Dow Chemical Co., 749 F.2d at 312-13.
50. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
51. Id at 353.
52. See United States v. Richards, 638 F.2d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975).
53. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); Rakas v. illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
54. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977); Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
55. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960) (fourth amendment privacy inter-
est in apartment in which individual slept and kept clothes), overruled in United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980) (overruling only on procedural grounds relating to standing
rules).
56. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 7-9.
57. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144
n.12 (since a property owner has the right to exclude others, he or she likely has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the property); id. at 153 (Powell, J., concurring) (same); Patler v.
Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 478 (4th Cir. 1974) ('The maxim of Katz that the Fourth Amendment
protects 'people not places' is of only limited usefulness, for in considering what people can
reasonably expect to maintain as private we must inevitably speak in terms of places."); United
States v. Roberts, 747 F.2d 537, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1984) (property line/curtilage analysis is
initial inquiry in applying the Katz test). But see United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849,
855 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986) (fourth amendment protection "turns on the degree of privacy which
the individual is seeking to preserve, rather than on the 'ancient concept of curtilage' ").
58. The seminal post-Katz decision recognizing the survival of property line tests is Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
The Oliver Court held that the "open fields" doctrine of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.
57 (1924), a property line concept, should be applied to determine whether a warrantless
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II. Warrantless Aerial Surveillance Under the Fourth
Amendment
In warrantless aerial surveillance cases with a valid subjective expec-
tation of privacy,5 9 courts have utilized two approaches in determining
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. Under the first ap-
proach, the subjective expectation of privacy is per se reasonable, and
thus warrantless surveillance is per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.eo
Under the second approach, courts implement a balancing test.6
Different courts have applied various factors, but four factors commonly
used are
1) Extent of compliance with minimum altitude regulations;62
search was valid because it occurred in open fields. Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
reaffirmed the rule in Hester, stating, "an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for
activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the
home." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.
If the area involved is outside the curtilage (Le., in open fields), then, as a matter of law,
there cannot be a legitimate expectation of privacy, and hence no fourth amendment protec-
tions extend. Id at 180. The curtilage and open fields property lines clearly remain applicable
after Katz.
The Oliver Court, however, limited the common law property line trespass standard in
fourth amendment jurisprudence. The Court stated that simply because the government intru-
sion would be a trespass at common law, it was not necessarily a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Trespass was held too broad a standard, and the existence of property rights
inconclusive regarding expectations of privacy. Thus the Fourth Amendment may not be im-
plicated even when trespass has occurred. Id at 183.
The Oliver Court, in reaffirming Hester, concluded that the Fourth Amendment protects
the curtilage. In light of the Katz test however, the Court's definition of curtilage was based on
whether an individual had a reasonable expectation that an area should be treated as a home.
Id at 180. A central aspect of this determination, according to the Court, was whether the
area harbored "intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the priva-
cies of life. . . .'" Id (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
59. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text for the two approaches generally used,
"ground level" or "aerial," in deciding if a subjective privacy expectation exists.
60. People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984), rev'd, 476 U.S.
207 (1986). This per se approach, however, is not a strict application of the Katz test, since
under Katz two questions must be answered. To reason that "because a subjective expectation
of privacy, therefore a reasonable expectation of privacy," does not inquire into society's objec-
tive view of the expectation of privacy.
61. United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980) (discounting telephoto lens use),
cerL denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981).
62. "'Navigable airspace' means airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight pre-'
scribed by regulations issued under this chapter, and shall include airspace needed to insure
safety in take-off and landing of aircraft." 49 U.S.C. § 1301(29) (1989). Further, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1304 (1989) declares a "public right of freedom of transit through the navigable airspace of
the United States." Under the Code of Federal Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1989), mini-
mum safe altitudes are defined as follows:
Except when necessary for takeoff or landing, no person may operate an aircraft
below the following altitudes:...
2) Commonness and frequency of plane overflights of the area 6 3
3) Duration of surveillance;" and
4) Sensory-enhancing equipment used (Le., telescopes, cameras,
etc.)6 5
A. The Supreme Court in Aerial Surveillance Cases
In 1986 the Supreme Court decided, for the first time, two aerial
surveillance cases under the Fourth Amendment: California v. Ciraolo6 6
and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States.67 These two cases greatly im-
pacted the Katz standard as applied to aerial surveillance cases, resulting
in a narrowing of fourth amendment protection in this area. These cases
were the primary predecessors of Florida v. Riley.6"
L California v. Ciraolo
In Ciraolo, the police went to defendant's house after receiving an
anonymous tip that defendant grew marijuana in his backyard. The po-
lice could not see into the yard because it was enclosed by two fences.
The officers then obtained a private fixed-wing airplane for the specific
purpose of observing Ciraolo's backyard.6 9 From an altitude of 1000
(b) Over congested areas Over any congested area of a city, town, or settlement, or
over any open air assembly of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest
obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft.
(c) Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above the surface except
over open water or sparsely populated areas. In that case, the aircraft may not be
operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.
(d) Helicopters. Helicopters may be operated at less than the minimums prescribed
in paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section if the operation is conducted without hazard to
persons or property on the surface. In addition, each person operating a helicopter
shall comply with routes or altitudes specifically prescribed for helicopters by the
Administrator.
63. See Allen, 633 F.2d at 1282 (routine coast guard overflights defeat reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy from such surveillance); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 570 P. 2d 1323 (1977)
(when defendant can show rarity of overflights, his or her privacy expectation receives more
weight).
64. See Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945
(N.D. Cal. 1985); Stachler, 58 Haw. at 418, 570 P.2d at 1328; United States v. Broadhurst, 805
F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150
(1973) (one of many factors includes "the type and character of invasion by the governmental
authority," and the court held that noisy, unreasonably low helicopter surveillance violates
reasonable expectations of privacy).
65. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). But cf Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (use of sensory-enhancing equipment not generally available
may be barred).
66. 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (aerial surveillance of private curtilage from 1000 feet in a fixed-
wing aircraft held not a search).
67. 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (aerial surveillance of a private business complex held not a
search since the area surveyed was not curtilage).
68. 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
69. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209-10.
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feet, the officers identified the marijuana plants, obtained a search war-
rant based on these observations, and seized the plants. The trial court
denied Ciraolo's motion to suppress the plants, and convicted the defend-
ant for illegally cultivating marijuana.
The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding the warrantless
aerial surveillance of defendant's backyard unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.7' The United States Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing the warrantless aerial surveillance of a private residence's curtilage
from an altitude of 1000 feet valid under the Fourth Amendment.7 1
The Ciraolo Court found Katz controlling. Under the two-prong
test, Ciraolo met the subjective expectation of privacy test with respect to
the curtilage, but the Court found this expectation "unreasonable.
72
The Court reaffirmed the curtilage doctrine,73 finding the yard within the
curtilage of Ciraolo's home. The Court, however, relied on three factors
to find that although a person takes reasonable steps to protect the curti-
lage from some views, not all views of the curtilage are thereby
foreclosed.74
One factor was the availability of the airspace to the general public
for air travel. The police viewed what "[a]ny member of the public...
could have seen .... ,71 Additionally, the Ciraolo Court found that the
police were situated legally under Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) regulations, 76 and finally, the Court emphasized that the police
conducted the observations in .a "physically nonintrusive manner."
77
2. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States
In Ciraolo's companion case, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,78
the Court also reaffirmed the curtilage doctrine, but held that no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy attached to Dow's 2000-acre manufacturing
complex since it was not curtilage. Thus, the Court held that the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's (EPA) warrantless surveillance, using a
sophisticated aerial mapping camera from altitudes of 1200, 3000, and
12,000 feet, was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.79
70. People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984), rev'd, 476 U.S.
207, 210 (1986).
71. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 210.
72. Id. at 213-14.
73. Id at 213.
74. See id. at 213-14 (where the curtilage observed from a public vantage point is in open
view, observation is not an illegal search).
75. d at 213.
76. See statutes cited supra note 62.
77. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
78. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
79. Id. at 239.
In Dow, the EPA engaged in aerial surveillance without informing
Dow. As soon as Dow discovered the observations, it sued to enjoin the
surveillance as violating the Fourth Amendment. ° The district court,
applying Katz, found a subjective expectation of privacy manifested by
Dow's use of buildings and other enclosures to surround its open areas.81
The court proceeded to hold the subjective privacy expectation reason-
able in light of trade secret protections restricting similar photography by
Dow's commercial competitors.8 2 The district court thus granted the
injunction.
The court of appeals reversed.83 Unlike the district court, the appel-
late court would have applied the "aerial" approach to determine
whether Dow had a subjective expectation of privacy. Since Dow had
not taken any precautions against aerial observation, the court stated
that Dow likely had no subjective expectation of privacy. 4 The court,
however, rested its decision on other grounds. It accepted the subjective
expectation of privacy finding of the district court and applied the second
prong of the Katz test. The court viewed the area as more akin to "open
fields" under Oliver v. United States85 than to a home or curtilage, and
thus did not apply the curtilage doctrine to the area observed.86
The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the appellate court's ex-
clusion of the area surveyed from curtilage:
The intimate activities associated with family privacy and the
home and its curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or
spaces between structures and buildings of a manufacturing
plant.8 7
The Dow Court, however, also refused to classify the area as "open
fields." The land "can perhaps be seen as falling somewhere between
'open fields' and curtilage, but lacking some of the critical characteristics
80. Dow also alleged that the EPA had violated its statutory investigative authority, id. at
230, but that allegation is not relevant to this discussion.
81. Dow Chemical Co., 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1364-66 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 749 F.2d 307
(6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). The district court applied the "ground-level,"
rather than "aerial," approach to determine Dow's subjective expectation of privacy, stating,
"This court is not prepared to conclude that Dow must build a dome over its entire plant
before it can be said to have manifested or exhibited an expectation of privacy." Id. at 1365.
See United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1289 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833
(1981).
82. Dow Chemical Co., 536 F. Supp. at 1366-69.
83. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227
(1986).
84. I at 312-13.
85. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
86. Dow Chemical Co., 749 F.2d at 313-14.
87. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986). The Court adopted the
Oliver definition. 466 U.S. at 180 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
See supra note 58.
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of both." 8
Ciraolo and Dow dramatically narrowed fourth amendment protec-
tion against aerial surveillance. The Ciraolo Court's application of the
"aerial" approach, and the Dow Court's limited definition of land consti-
tuting curtilage significantly reduced the traditional scope of the fourth
amendment protections and the curtilage doctrine. Despite the Court's
reaffirmation of the curtilage doctrine in both cases, it is difficult to imag-
ine a case where an observation of curtilage, from a lawful altitude,
would violate the Fourth Amendment. If one can view the curtilage
from a public area, Ciraolo affords no protection. If the curtilage cannot
be viewed, or "all views" are successfully blocked, no need arises for
fourth amendment protection. 9
Ciraolo and Dow opened the door to further restriction of fourth
amendment protection by tying the level of fourth amendment protection
to the definition of lawful (or public) viewing locations (ie., where law
enforcement legally can be). Such restriction occurred in Florida v.
Riley.90
III. Florida v. Riley
A. Factual Background
Deputy Sheriff Kurt Gell, of the Pasco County Sheriff's office, acted
upon an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown on defendant
Michael Riley's property.91 Arriving at Riley's mobile home, Gell could
not view from ground level the contents of a greenhouse approximately
ten to twenty feet behind the mobile home. A "DO NOT ENTER" sign
was posted in front of the mobile home, and the greenhouse was enclosed
on two sides by opaque walls. Trees, shrubs, and the mobile home itself
obscured the view from the other sides.92
Gell then obtained a helicopter and, at an altitude of 400 feet, cir-
cled over the property twice. As the helicopter circled, Gell made naked-
eye observations of the greenhouse contents through openings in the
'88. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 236. Apparently, Dow's development of the area
caused the Court difficulty in classifying the area in the traditional scheme, since the Oliver
Court noted that "[i]t is lear... that the term 'open fields'... may include any unoccupied or
undeveloped area outside of the curtilage." Id. at 237 n.3 (emphasis added) (quoting Oliver, 466
U.S. at 180 n.ll).
89. This result follows because, if all views are blocked, there cannot be a warrantless
search of anything, since there is nothing to see!
90. 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
91. Id. at 695.
92. Id.
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roof'9 and sides. He concluded the greenhouse contained marijuana, 94
and obtained a warrant based on these aerial observations. The subse-
quent search confirmed that marijuana was growing in the greenhouse,9 5
and Riley was charged with the manufacture and possession of mari-
juana under Florida law.96
B. The Lower Court Decisions
The trial court granted Riley's motion to suppress the evidence,
finding the warrantless aerial observation violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. The court held that the greenhouse was within the curtilage, a
constitutionally protected area. Further, the structure, and the roof, in-
dicated a desire for privacy from aerial view. Riley, the court found, thus
exhibited an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy in a constitu-
tionally protected area, obtaining fourth amendment protection under
the Katz test and curtilage doctrine.
The court of appeals reversed,97 relying on the prior Florida case of
Randall v. State.98 The court stated that Riley's case differed from Ran-
dall "only in the fact that [Riley] had erected a roof over most of his
greenhouse." 99 The court held this difference irrelevant since both Ran-
dall and Riley manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial
surveillance and the police were legally positioned."o
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and rein-
stated the motion to suppress granted by the trial court. 10 1 In reversing,
the Florida Supreme Court utilized the Katz two-prong test, finding that
"as in Ciraolo, there is no question.., that the first prong of the Katz test
93. aId Although there was dispute as to how the openings in the roof came to exist, the
two missing roof panels resulted in approximately 10 percent of the roof area being exposed.
Id
94. Id.
95. The evidence seized included 44 marijuana plants found growing in the greenhouse.
State v. Riley, 476 So. 2d 1354, 1355 (1985).
96. The charges consisted of two counts of unlawful manufacture and possession of mari-
juana. FLA. STAT. § 893.13 (1983).
97. State v. Riley, 476 So. 2d 1354 (1985).
98. 458 So. 2d 822 (1984). In Randall, the police received a tip that the defendant was
growing marijuana in his backyard, but could not see the plants from ground level because of a
fence. The police identified the plants from a helicopter flying at a routine patrol altitude,
obtained a warrant based on the observations, and seized the plants. Id. at 823-24. Despite
finding a reasonable expectation of privacy from ground-level and aerial surveillance, the court
concluded that aerial surveillance by the police from a legal location did not constitute an
intrusion rising to the level of an impermissible search. Id. at 825.
99. 476 So. 2d at 1356.
100. Id.
101. Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282 (1987). The Florida Supreme Court dispelled Randall,
458 So. 2d 822 (1984), since California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), and Dow Chemical Co.
v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), were decided after the appellate court decision.
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has been met."" °2 The court also found, as in Ciraolo, that "the area in
question constituted the curtilage," and therefore deserved a high degree
of fourth amendment protection."0 3
The Florida Supreme Court then distinguished Ciraolo and Dow in
finding that Riley's expectation of privacy was reasonable, meeting the
second prong of the Katz test. The court stated that Ciraolo stopped far
short of sanctioning unlimited rights to aerial surveillance. Rather, it
limited permissible observation "to the 'naked eye' from 'navigable air-
space' at an 'altitude of 1000 feet' in a 'physically nonintrusive man-
ner.' ,'14 The court distinguished Riley from Ciraolo and Dow on the
grounds that helicopters hovering at 400 feet are different from fixed-
wing aircraft flying at 1000 feet. The court observed that helicopter sur-
veillance poses a peculiar risk to privacy,"0 5 in that a person casually
flying over the area in a fixed-wing aircraft could not just as easily "have
seen everything that these officers observed"'0 6 from their circling
helicopter. 107
C. The United States Supreme Court
L The Plurality Opinion
Justice White, writing for the plurality,'08 reversed the Florida
Supreme Court, holding that police surveillance by a helicopter 400 feet
over respondent's greenhouse (curtilage) was not a search under the
Fourth Amendment.
The plurality, unlike the Florida Supreme Court, found Ciraolo con-
trolling since the police, as in Ciraolo, were legally situated.'0 9 The
greenhouse was held within the curtilage of Riley's dwelling, unviewable
102. Riley, 511 So. 2d at 286. The court looked to the opacity of the greenhouse, the fence
surrounding it, and the "DO NOT ENTER" sign as indicating Riley's subjective expectation
of privacy.
103. Id The greenhouse was held to be within close vicinity of the residence, and therefore
within the purview of common law curtilage, following the definition set forth in Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
104. Riley, 511 So. 2d at 287.
105. Id. at 287-88 (citing Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen,
608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985), and discussing with approval People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App.
3d 845, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (aerial surveillance held unconstitutional on virtually identical facts
to Riley), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1058 (1986)).
106. Riley, 511 So. 2d at 285 (emphasis omitted) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 213-14 (1986)).
107. See id. at 288.
108. The plurality consisted of Justices White, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy.
109. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 695 (1989) (plurality opinion). Because helicopters
are not bound by the minimum altitudes for fixed-wing aircraft established by FAA regula-
tions, the police were in "navigable airspace" for any member of the public flying in a helicop-
ter. See statutes cited supra note 62.
from ground-level, like Ciraolo's yard. "' The plurality also held that
Riley, like Ciraolo, manifested a subjective expectation of privacy from
ground-level surveillance under the Katz test."'
As in Ciraolo, however, the plurality went on to state that a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy from ground-level surveillance does not fore-
close viewing from the air." 2 Therefore, Riley did not manifest a
reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance (Le., the sub-
jective expectation of privacy was not one that "society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable' ").113 The plurality found that Riley, by failing
to cover the entire roof of the greenhouse, left the contents "subject to
viewing from the air.""' 4 Effectively, Riley "knowingly expose[d]" the
greenhouse contents, thereby exempting them from fourth amendment
protection."15
Moreover, the plurality stated that there is no indication that such
helicopter flights were unheard of in Pasco County, and thus Riley could
not reasonably have expected that his greenhouse would not be visible to
those flying in navigable airspace, as in Ciraolo.116
Finally, the plurality found no evidence that the helicopter inter-
fered with Riley's normal use of the greenhouse or other parts of the
curtilage; "no intimate details connected with the use of the home or
curtilage were observed, and there was no undue noise, no wind, dust, or
threat of injury.""' 7 Thus, the plurality found no fourth amendment
violation."18
2 Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, agreed that "police observa-
tion of the greenhouse in Riley's curtilage from a helicopter ... . 400 feet
[off the ground] did not violate an expectation of privacy 'that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable."' "119 In her view, however, the
plurality's approach overemphasized compliance with FAA regulations
in determining the scope of fourth amendment protection. She argued
110. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 696 (plurality opinion).
111. Id.
112. Id; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
113. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, L, concurring).
114. Florida v. Riley, 109.S. Ct. 693, 696 (1989) (plurality opinion).
115. See id at 696-97; cf Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (quotingKatz, 389 U.S. at 351) ("What a
person knowingly exposes to the public.., is not a subject of fourth amendment protection.").
116. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 696 (plurality opinion); see Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
117. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 697 (plurality opinion). Note that this statement substitutes a test
for the "physically nonintrusive" attribute of the observation in Ciraolo. Since the observation
is found generally nonintrusive under this articulated standard, Ciraolo controls.
118. Id.
119. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 697 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
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that the FAA regulations were designed "to promote air safety not to
protect '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' "120
Justice O'Connor rejected FAA-standard compliance as the relevant
test. She argued that the relevant inquiry after Ciraolo was "whether the
helicopter was in the public airways at an altitude at which members of
the public travel with sufficient regularity that Riley's expectation of pri-
vacy from aerial observation was not 'one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as "reasonable." ' ,121 She reasoned that flight in public airways
is routine in today's society, so, as in Ciraolo, no reasonable expectation
of privacy from observation from public airways is possible. 2 2 Since
"there is reason to believe that there is considerable public use of airspace
at altitudes of 400 feet and above, and because Riley introduced no evi-
dence to the contrary" in the lower courts, Justice O'Connor concluded
Riley's expectation of privacy was unreasonable. 23
Justice O'Connor placed the burden of proof on the defendant to
demonstrate the reasonableness of the privacy expectation,'24 and that
the observation constituted a fourth amendment "search." In view of
O'Connor's belief that flight in public airways is routine in our modem
society, defendant's burden is substantial. To meet this burden, the de-
fendant would have to show that public use of airspace at 400 feet is so
rare that the public cannot be said to "generally use" such airspace; 125
only then might aerial surveillance from such altitudes violate reasonable
expectations of privacy, despite FAA-regulation compliance.126 After
defining Riley's burden of proof, Justice O'Connor argued that the case
should not be remanded since Riley had not introduced any evidence in
the lower courts as to the amount of public use of the airways. 127
3. Justice Brennan's Dissent
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens,
was a scathing attack on the plurality's reasoning. The dissenters argued
that the plurality acted as though Katz had never been decided. They
claimed that the plurality "summarily conclude[d]" Riley's expectation
120. Id (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
121. Id at 698 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
122. Id at 697-98 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986)).
123. Id at 699.
124. Id
125. Id at 698-99.
126. See id. While the plurality does not directly discuss burden of proof allocation, it
implies that the situation might change if there were evidence in the record indicating a rarity
of helicopter flights at 400 feet. That evidence might "lend substance to respondent's claim
that he reasonably anticipated that his greenhouse would not be subject to observation from
that altitude." Id. at 696-97.
127. Id. at 698-99.
Summer 19901]LRD v IE
of privacy was unreasonable because "[a]ny member of the public- could
legally have been flying over Riley's property in a helicopter at the alti-
tude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley's greenhouse."' 28 The
dissent claimed this was the wrong test: the Court should have examined
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy could have existed. Justice
Brennan argued that, under the plurality's test, the overflight frequency
did not matter, since the expectation of privacy was defeated if one mem-
ber of the public could have legally viewed the area.' 29 He continued,
arguing that this was a poor standard since very few members of the
public could have obtained a police officer's aerial view, and thus an ex-
pectation of privacy may have remained reasonable.
Justice Brennan further disparaged the plurality opinion for relying
on flight safety regulations in defining the scope of fourth amendment
protection. Additionally, he noted that the Supreme Court had consist-
ently refused to equate police violation of law with fourth amendment
infringement. Hence, he found it odd that the plurality relied so heavily
on the legality of the officer's act.'30
Brennan, moreover, found no limit to the plurality's holding because
FAA regulations set no minimum altitude for helicopters.' 3 ' The plural-
ity's expressed limits of undue noise, wind, dust, or threat of injury,3 2
Brennan argued, have no place in fourth amendment jurisprudence; they
give rise to possible tort remedies for inverse condemnation or nuisance.
Justice Brennan concluded the Fourth Amendment need not protect
against such intrusions.
Finally, Justice Brennan harshly criticized the plurality's "intimate
details" exception 133 as too vague and ambiguous. He accused the plu-
rality of being results-oriented (Le., finding no constitutional violation
since this was a "drug case"), and argued that the Fourth Amendment
cannot be so, since it was designed to protect everyone's security.'3 4
Justice Brennan criticized Justice O'Connor's rejection of the consti-
tutional claim resulting from her belief that "considerable" public flying
at this altitude occurred, and from Riley's failure to introduce "evidence
to the contrary before the Florida courts."' 135 Brennan proposed, in-
stead, either judicial notice of the helicopter flight frequency, or burden
of proof allocation to the state (since it had greater access to the informa-
tion) to show customary flight patterns and thus prove defendant's pri-
128. Id. at 699-700 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting plurality opinion, id. at 697).
129. Id at 700.
130. Id. at 700-01.
131. See statutes cited supra note 62.
132. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 697 (plurality opinion).
133. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
134. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 703 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Id at 704 (quoting O'Connor, J., concurring, id at 699).
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vacy expectation unreasonable. 136
4. Justice Blackmun's Dissent
In a dissent more narrowly focused than Justice Brennan's, Justice
Blackmun stated the question as "whether the helicopter surveillance
over Riley's property constituted a 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. ' 137 Justice Blackmun phrased the essential inquiry
as "whether Riley ha[d] a 'reasonable expectation of privacy' that no
such surveillance would occur .... ",138 He did not inquire whether the
helicopter was in lawful airspace under FAA regulations, 139 and noted
that five justices agreed this was the proper approach."4 The same five
justices, according to Justice Blackmun, agreed that the reasonableness
of the expectation- of privacy depended on the frequency of non-police
helicopter flights at 400 feet. It was this factual point's determination,
Justice Blackmun suggested, that separated the justices.141
Justice Blackmun disliked Justice Brennan's judicial notice ap-
proach to the determination. He felt that the Court should not adopt a
national per se rule based on judicial notions alone.1 42 Rather, Justice
Blackmun claimed, the record should have contained evidence on the
subject. 143
As to who carried the burden to introduce this evidence, Justice
Blackmun would have imposed it on the prosecution to show the lack of
any reasonable privacy expectation for surveillance below 1000 feet (that
not covered by Ciraolo).1  Although the prosecution did not meet this
burden, Justice Blackmun felt that the burden allocation issue previously
was not clear, and thus he would have remanded the case to allow the
prosecution to meet its burden.145
Justice Blackmun noted, on this point, that he and Justice O'Connor
differed only in that O'Connor placed the burden on Riley, and would
not allow him an opportunity to meet the burden on remand.1 46 Thus,
he concluded, O'Connor joined the plurality's view that no fourth
amendment search occurred, and he dissented.' 47
136. Id
137. Id at 705 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
138. Id
139. Id
140. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor, and himself.




145. Id.. But see sources cited infra note 195.
146. Presumably because he did not try to do so in the Florida courts. See id. at 699
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. Id at 705-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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IV. Criticism of Riley's Holding and Analysis
A. Ciraolo Distinguished
When the Court held Ciraolo controlled in Riley, it both ignored
several important differences between the two cases and misapplied the
Katz test.
Ciraolo and Riley differ in one important fact. Ciraolo involved a
fixed-wing aircraft, while Riley involved a helicopter. The Court held the
two equal for inspection purposes since "private and commercial flight
[by helicopter] in the public airways is routine" '148 and there was no indi-
cation that such flights were unheard of in Pasco County, Florida.14 9
The Court thus concluded that Riley could not reasonably have expected
that his greenhouse was protected from helicopter observation if the heli-
copter had been flying within the navigable airspace for fixed-wing air-
craft. 1 0 While such a conclusion may have been true, it did not relate to
the case at hand. The helicopter was not within navigable airspace for
fixed-wing aircraft-it was 100 feet below the lower limit for such
aircraft.151
Further, by holding the helicopter and fixed-wing craft equal, the
Riley Court ignored crucial differences between the two aircraft.
First, a helicopter, unlike a fixed-wing aircraft, has an ability to
hover.1 52 This gives passengers additional time to scan a particular area.
The helicopter effectively becomes an aerial viewing platform, affording
views otherwise unavailable. Also, by hovering, a helicopter allows pas-
sengers time to seek out small objects otherwise unviewable from con-
stantly moving fixed-wing aircraft.' 53
Further, the helicopter has the ability to move straight up and
down. 5 4 It therefore requires much less clear airspace to maneuver,
whereas a fixed-wing aircraft that is forced to move horizontally and
148. Ia1 at 696 (plurality opinion) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986)).
149. Id
150. Id
151. See statutes cited supra note 62.
152. For purposes of this article, fixed-wing aircraft with the ability to hover, such as the
Harrier or similar VTOL (Vertical Takeoff and Landing) aircraft, are ignored since they are
primarily military aircraft. If such an aircraft were to someday be employed by law enforce-
ment, it should be evaluated by the same fourth amendment standards as a helicopter because
of its special flying abilities.
153. In the extreme case, one can imagine an area with just one possible view. In such a
case, the helicopter could be positioned in just the right place to afford such a view, and could
then hover to afford passengers and photographers a long look. This might not be possible
with a constantly moving fixed-wing aircraft.
154. See 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 63 (1987); VAN NOSTRAND'S SCIENTIFIc ENCY-
CLOPEDIA 825-27 (Van Nostrand Co. 4th ed. 1968).
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bank its turns requires much more clear airspace.15 5
The crucial aspect of the analysis of Ciraolo and Riley, therefore,
should not be that the helicopter and fixed-wing crafts are the same be-
cause public airway flight is so common. A helicopter has "truly unique
capabilities," 15 6 and thus can be a more intrusive surveillance tool. Heli-
copter surveillance by law enforcement, therefore, deserves closer scru-
tiny since the dangers to fourth amendment liberties are greater.
The Supreme Court thus should have examined the differences in
apparatus used before simply applying Ciraolo to a helicopter surveil-
lance case like Riley. Fourth amendment protections should not vary
with mere changes in police apparatus, and these protections should be
construed broadly when such potentially intrusive devices as helicopters
are used.
In addition to the difference in flying ability, another distinction be-
tween helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft can be drawn from the different
definition of lawful altitudes for helicopters as compared with other air-
craft under FAA regulations. In Ciraolo, the aircraft flew at 1000 feet; in
Riley, the aircraft was 400 feet off the ground. The Riley Court, while
issuing a disclaimer,157 stated that Riley was the same as Ciraolo in that
"[a]ny member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley's
property in a helicopter at... 400 feet and could have observed Riley's
greenhouse. The police officer did no more."15 Further, the Court
stated that "[w]e would have a different case if... [flying the helicopter
at 400 feet] had been contrary to law or regulation." 15 9
Despite the Court's disclaimer, the plurality intimately ties fourth
amendment protection to FAA regulation compliance, a union rejected
by the other five justices." °
155. This attribute could be important. If the walls of a canyon, each 600 feet high, sur-
rounded land to be observed, a plane could not survey the land at any lower than 600 feet
(even disregarding FAA regulations). A helicopter, by contrast, could drop straight down into
the canyon and survey from any altitude.
156. See, eg., People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 853, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170, 175 (judicially
noticing unique flying capabilities of helicopters), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1058 (1986); People v.
Romo, 198 Cal. App. 3d 581, 588, 243 Cal. Rptr. 801, 805 (1988) (same).
157. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 697 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("This is not to say that
an inspection of the curtilage of a house from an aircraft will always pass muster under the
Fourth Amendment simply because the plane is within the navigable airspace specified by
law.").
158. Id. at 697.
159. Id. at 696. Although the Court disclaims it, observation from navigable airspace (a
legal vantage point) seems, under California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), Dow Chemical
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), and now Riley, automatically to pass constitutional
muster. Even if non-automatic, it is clearly, in the words of the plurality, "of obvious impor-
tance [in upholding such observation]." Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 697 (emphasis added).
160. See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
The different treatment of helicopters and other aircraft under FAA
regulations creates problems when fourth amendment protections are
tied to these regulations.
First, the FAA minimum altitude regulations vary with changes in
hazard level associated with population density.161 By tying fourth
amendment protections to these regulations, greater fourth amendment
protection exists in congested areas since surveillance must be conductedl
from farther away. 162 Can it realistically be argued that mere changes of
observation location within an area potentially as small as a county limits
fourth amendment protection? The answer is no. The Fourth Amend-
ment's protections are not designed on a sliding scale to allow invasions
in one area that are barred in another. The Amendment is a guarantor of
each individual's security, and it cannot grant one individual greater se-
curity merely because of fortuitous locale.
Second, the FAA regulations define "minimum safe altitudes."' 163
The minimum altitudes specified relate expressly to potential obstacles
encountered in flight.6 As Justice Brennan correctly noted, they are
obviously safety regulations. As such, they should not be used as a yard-
stick to measure personal security, for they are unrelated to the security
interests safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment. 165
Due to the different treatment of the two aircraft and the safety
goals of the FAA regulations, the-Riley Court should have been far more
wary of holding Ciraolo, a fixed-wing aircraft surveillance case, control-
ling in Riley, a helicopter surveillance case, on the basis that the two craft
were legally situated under FAA regulations.
Other factual differences between Ciraolo and Riley should have led
the Court to distinguish the cases, rather than finding Ciraolo controlling
in Riley.
Importantly from a fourth amendment perspective, the altitude dif-
ferences between Ciraolo and Riley, 1000 feet and 400 feet, respectively,
alter what is visible to the naked eye from 400 feet up, as opposed to 1000
feet.166 It is arguable that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
for objects viewable from 1000 feet up, 167 because any object that can be
seen clearly from 1000 feet away is likely so large that it cannot reason-
ably be expected to be concealed. It is "knowingly exposed" under
Ciraolo.168
161. See statutes cited supra note 62.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(b), (q), (d) (1989).
165. See Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 702-03 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. Absent visual aids, a fixed-size object is more easily viewed at closer range, and there-
fore altitude does impact an individual's privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
167. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
168. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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The Court, by allowing the 1000-foot standard to be dropped to
"400 feet by helicopter," allows a mere change in police apparatus to
permit surveillance of significantly smaller objects otherwise unviewable.
This causes severe problems for the curtilage doctrine. For example, a
small item lying in the curtilage of a home, otherwise totally blocked
from ground-level view and unviewable from 1000 feet, is now poten-
tially visible to the police in helicopters at 400 feet.'6 9 In such a case, it is
difficult to say that the person keeping the item within the curtilage has
no reasonable expectation of privacy attaching to it. By its holding, how-
ever, the Court effectively forces individuals to withdraw from their cur-
tilage and to shelter objects within the confines of the home itself,
behavior antithetical to the goals of the Fourth Amendment. 170
Justice Brennan also notes that the plurality's three apparent limits
on surveillance-where it "interfere[s] with ... normal use of ... the
curtilage"; where "intimate details connected with the use of the home or
curtilage [are observed; or where there is] undue noise,... wind, dust, or
threat of injury"17'-are simply too vague to be effective. 72 Addition-
ally, the limits may vary with changes in location. The liberty guaran-
teed by the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect "the people"
from an intrusive government, not just those in certain localities.173 The
mere fact that the government does not disturb surrounding areas during
its invasion is irrelevant to whether people's legitimate expectations of
privacy are intruded upon.
Moreover, it is arguable that one's personal farming habits, con-
ducted within a greenhouse, are "intimate details connected with the use
169. While permissible vision-enhancing devices would allow viewing of extremely small
objects from high altitude, one wonders whether a court concerned with safeguarding privacy
expectations might not bar such a device. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
238 (1986), indicated that certain high-tech equipment not generally available might be "con-
stitutionally proscribed absent a warrant." The limits of this statement are untested, but
Supreme Court support apparently exists for limiting overly intrusive high-tech equipment.
170. While it may be argued that only those with something to hide will be so affected, one
must bear in mind that such an argument is contrary to the goals of personal security from
governmental invasion underlying the Fourth Amendment. Rather, as Justice Brennan points
out, the Fourth Amendment protects everyone's interest inpersonalsecurity and privacy. "The
question is not whethdr you and I must draw the blinds before we commit a crime. It is
whether you and I must discipline ourselves to draw the blinds every time we enter a room,
under pain of surveillance if we do not." Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 703 (1989) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (quoting Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 403 (1974)).
171. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 697 (plurality opinion).
172. See id at 702-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Note also that there are other tort reme-
dies that protect such invasionary interests, like nuisance or inverse condemnation. See id
173. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also supra text accompanying notes 161-162.
of the home or curtilage."' 17 Protecting an individual's expectation that
he or she will not be watched by the government during such activities is
at the heart of the Fourth Amendment. As technology advances, Justice
Brennan's hypothetical regarding the silent, noiseless helicopter becomes
more likely.17 5 The plurality's expressed limits of undue wind, noise,
dust or threat of injury neither reflect the principles of personal security
embodied in the Fourth Amendment and the Katz test, nor are they
likely to stand the test of time. Further, lower courts face difficulties in
quantifying the "undue" standards the Court proffered. The Fourth
Amendment is thereby subjected to case by case, ad hoc adjudication,
and protections are certain to vary by region. This cannot be the opti-
mum result when personal security interests are at stake.
B. The Plurality's Misapplication of the Katz Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy Test
The Riley decision, by following Ciraolo, further abandoned the
two-prong Katz test for a reasonable expectation of privacy in aerial sur-
veilance cases. The Court also ignored well-reasoned lower court deci-
sions applying Katz to aerial surveillance cases. 176 Under a proper
application of the Katz test and subsequent case law, the Riley decision
would have been very different, while remaining reconcilable with the
Ciraolo decision.
The Riley Court found that Riley had a subjective privacy expecta-
tion from ground-level surveillance. The trees, shrubs, mobile home, and
opaque walls surrounding the greenhouse and blocking its view, along
with a "DO NOT ENTER" sign in front, all indicate that Riley expected
privacy from ground-level observation, and took steps to prevent such
observation. 17 7 Under Ciraolo and Dow, however, preclusion of ground-
level observation is not enough, since not all views are thereby foreclosed,
and no expectation of privacy exists from aerial surveillance. The green-
house itself, however, provides a key fact showing a privacy expectation
from aerial surveillance, and a key distinction from Ciraolo and Dow.
Unlike both Ciraolo and Dow, Riley had built a shelter over the
property at issue, albeit not a totally enclosed one. This shelter, nonexis-
tent in both Ciraolo and Dow, manifested Riley's intent to foreclose even
aerial viewing.
174. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 697 (plurality opinion). Although the Court seems to imply that
more controversial behavior is the key to invoking this standard, that is not altogether clear
from the opinion.
175. Id. at 702-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. See infra notes 183-191 & 193 and accompanying text.
177. Compare United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (police trespass over fences
evincing a subjective expectation of privacy was upheld, but under "open fields" exception).
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The missing panels in the greenhouse roof, ten percent of the struc-
ture's roof area, are deemed by the plurality to constitute knowing expo-
sure178 to the public flying overhead. Under the plurality's rule, if the
contents of a sheltered area are viewable through any holes, the expecta-
tion of privacy is negated by "knowing exposure." This approach is ex-
ceedingly grudging and contrary to the necessarily broad protections
properly afforded by the Fourth Amendment. "Knowing exposure" to
aerial surveillance is qualitatively different from "knowing exposure" to
sunlight and air-necessary items in a greenhouse environment. To
charge Riley with "knowledge" that his greenhouse could be warran-
tlessly aerially surveyed simply because he provided his plants with ne-
cessities of life creates an extremely narrow scope of fourth amendment
protection. This view is contrary to the general historical view that the
Fourth Amendment should be construed broadly to protect against the
"gradual depreciation" of such personal security rights. 179
Thus, under proper application of the Katz test, bearing the pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment closely in mind, Riley manifested a sub-
jective privacy expectation from aerial surveillance under Katz. This
result should hold, under the facts of Riley, even when one implements
the stringent "aerial" approach to the Katz inquiry.
The plurality in Riley also misconstrues the second prong of the
Katz test-whether the subjective expectation is reasonable. The Court
states, in determining whether Riley held a reasonable privacy expecta-
tion, that "there is no indication that such flights are unheard of in Pasco
County, Florida."' 0 This leads the plurality to conclude that no reason-
able privacy expectation existed.
The Court's analysis and subsequent conclusions are flawed. First,
in forming its conclusion, the plurality relies on statistics that are, at best,
of questionable value.1 1  The statistics cited in footnote two of the
Court's opinion sound impressive. Upon close examination, however,
they are not meaningful. The stated number of helicopters in police use
is a nine-year-old figure, and the plurality uses these general, national
statistics to justify its result in Pasco County, Florida. Similarly, the
178. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
179. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
180. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696 (1989) (plurality opinion).
181. Id. at n.2:
The first use of the helicopter by police was in New York in 1947, and today every
state in the country uses helicopters in police work. As of 1980, there were 1500 of,
such aircraft used in police work. E. Brown, The Helicopter in Civil Operations 79
(1981). More than 10,000 helicopters, both public and private, are registered in the
United States. Federal Aviation Administration, Census of U.S. Civil Aircraft, Cal-
endar Year 1987, p. 12, and there are an estimated 31,697 helicopter pilots. Federal
Aviation Administration, Statistical Handbook of Aviation, Calendar Year 1986, p.
147. 1988 Helicopter Annual 9.
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Court's statement of the number of helicopters registered in the United
States is misleading because it does not indicate those registered in Flor-
ida, much less those based in or near Pasco County. The determinative
issue, however, is the reasonableness of the privacy expectation of the
Pasco County residents. Further, the estimated number of helicopter pi-
lots, without more, does nothing to show the unreasonableness of Riley's
privacy expectation from aerial surveillance in his Florida home. In fact,
with only 31,697 helicopter pilots of the approximately 240 million
United States residents, one may logically conclude that the "public" cer-
tainly does not "generally use" such airspace. At most, only about .01
percent of the "public" is a helicopter pilot!182 For the plurality to base
its conclusions on such misleading and relatively meaningless data is
questionable.
By concluding, without meaningful support, that Riley had no rea-
sonable privacy expectation in a historically protected area such as the
curtilage, the plurality disregarded many well-reasoned lower court deci-
sions, both federal and state, that have isolated certain factors in a post-
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry for aerial surveillance. 183
These factors include the
1) Altitude of the aircraft;' 84
2) Intensity of the surveillance;'
3) Equipment used in surveillance;' 86
4) Frequency of other ffights over the area;8 7
182. Even with a full complement of passengers, say 10 per helicopter, only .14 percent of
the "public" flies overhead in helicopters.
183. For a more detailed analysis of various factors used in determining the constitutional-
ity of aerial surveillance, see Note, Aerial Surveillance Withstands Fourth Amendment Scru-
tiny, 23 TULSA L.. 259 (1987).
184. See Dean v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr.
585 (1973). The general trend with respect to this factor is that no reasonable expectation of
privacy exists from surveillance at reasonable heights, absent other factors. Query whether
"navigable airspace," following California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), Dow Chemical Co.
v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), and Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989), is per se "reasonable."
But see People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (aerial surveillance violative
of Fourth Amendment due to low altitude (400 feet)), cert. deniedi 481 U.S. 1058 (1986).
185. See State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 418, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977); see also Nat'l
Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(low altitude "buzzings" and "dive bombings" violate reasonable expectations of privacy);
People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (noisy, unreasonably low
helicopter surveillance violates reasonable privacy expectations).
186. Law enforcement is generally given broad latitude in this area, so long as the equip-
ment is available to the general public. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
238 (1986) (upholding use of a sophisticated aerial mapping camera, stating that even with
such a sophisticated device "the photographs here are not so revealing ... as to raise constitu-
tional concerns"); supra notes 65 & 169 and accompanying text.
187. See United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980) (no reasonable expectation
of privacy from surveillance by routine coast guard flights), cert denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981);
Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989) (if defendant could show overflights were rare, his or
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5) Steps taken to protect privacy;"'
6) Level of open entry access to the area other than by
defendant;, 8 9
7) Randomness of the search;190
8) Location/nature of the property under surveillance.19'
Proper application of the second prong of the Katz test, as Justice
Blackmun correctly points out,192 requires inquiry into the actual fre-
quency of non-police helicopter flights at an altitude of 400 feet.
Whether Riley exposed the contents of his greenhouse to the public
should be ascertained with reference to where the public reasonably
would be expected to be. A line of well-reasoned post-Ciraolo cases sus-
tain privacy rights within the home or curtilage when the observations are
made from a lawful vantage point outside the curtilage, but from an area
not expected to be used by the public at large, or from an area where one
would not reasonably expect the public to have been.193 Even the peti-
tioner State of Florida agreed that Riley and his rural Pasco County
her expectation of privacy may receive greater weight); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 570
P.2d 1323 (1977) (same).
188. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207 (1986); United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981). The above cases
held the fact that defendant took steps to block ground-level views did not render aerial sur-
veillance unconstitutional. But see sources cited supra notes 46-47 for the "ground-level" ap-
proach; People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (defendant's expectation of
privacy was reasonable because of legitimate attempt to block aerial views), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1058 (1986).
189. The greater the open entry access by people other than the defendant, the fewer rea-
sonable expectations of privacy exist. See People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 541, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 150 (1973); Dean v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 115,
110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1973).
190. The less random the search, the less fourth amendment protection afforded. See
United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1290 (9th Cir. 1980) (where justification exists for
focused surveillance, as opposed to random surveillance, legitimacy under the Fourth Amend-
ment increases), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 837
(1984) (random aerial surveillance is analogous to the system in a police state and tends to
violate the Fourth Amendment).
191. Several lower courts have carefully differentiated between observations of open fields
(upheld) and curtilage (struck down), since warrantless police viewing by air of areas they
cannot see from the ground violates reasonable expectations of privacy historically inherent in
curtilage. See People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 382, 710 P.2d 299, 305, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 505
(1985) (fourth amendment rights to be free from warrantless searches are not waived simply
because all views are not blocked or because the public may occasionally glance down); Agee,
200 Cal. Rptr. at 829 (there is a constitutional right of privacy from state surveillance in
curtilage which cannot be invaded by ground or air unless the standards of the Fourth Amend-
ment are met).
192. Noting as well that Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor (five in all)
would agree. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 705 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
193. See United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987); State v.
Waldschmidt, 12 Kan. App. 2d 284, 740 P.2d 617 (1987).
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neighbors had no reason to anticipate low-altitude helicopter overflights
in the area. 19
4
Given the broad protection historically afforded the curtilage by the
Fourth Amendment, and the concession by the State that an expectation
of privacy was legitimate in Riley's area, Riley should have satisfied the
second prong of the Katz test. Katz was designed to safeguard the very
interest that the State conceded Riley reasonably possessed.
The plurality considered no data on the above subjects. In such a
situation, the proper result under Katz would be, at a minimum, for the
Court to remand the case to allow proof on this critical aspect of the Katz
test. As for which party bears the burden of proof on this issue, prior
case law would impose the burden on Riley to show that helicopters did
not actually fly over his home, and thus that his privacy expectation was
reasonable.195 In any event, the Court should have paid closer attention
to the factors highlighted by the many lower court decisions on the sub-
ject. These courts have far greater experience in formulating standards
for aerial surveillance cases than has the Supreme Court. No good rea-
son exists for the Court not to at least consider the lower courts' reason-
ing. By merely following Ciraolo as the ultimate authority on aerial
surveillance law, the Riley plurality, along with Justice O'Connor, con-
tinues to cut into the narrowing scope of fourth amendment protection in
aerial surveillance cases, and moves further away from the proper inquir-
ies under Katz for protecting fourth amendment security interests.
V. Questions Raised by the Riley Decision
Several questions are raised by the Riley decision which lower courts
must address in future aerial surveillance cases.
The first is whether any vitality remains in the curtilage doctrine.
Despite the Court's statement that Riley's greenhouse was within the
curtilage of his home, the Court disregarded lower court cases distin-
guishing such observation from observation of "open fields" 196 and up-
held the warrantless surveillance. Implicit in this holding is a firmer
belief than initially expressed in Ciraolo that if the area observed, even if
curtilage, is in "open view," such observation does not constitute an i1Me-
194. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 32, Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989) (No. 87-
764).
195. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n.1 (1978) ("The proponent of a motion to sup-
press has the burden of establishing that his own fourth amendment rights were violated by the
challenged search or seizure."); accord Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980);
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
261 (1960). But cf both Justice Brennan's and Justice Blackmun's burden allocation to the
prosecution, supra notes 136 & 144-145, respectively, and accompanying text. Nowhere does
either Justice explain, however, why the above-cited cases would not control the burden
allocation.
196. See supra notes 27-31 & 191.
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gal search. 197 Following Riley, unless care is taken to block all aerial as
well as ground-level views, no fourth amendment protection will attach
to the curtilage.198 This holding runs counter to the historical aims of
the Fourth Amendment, as well as the underlying Katz test. An individ-
ual, under Katz, was never required to foreclose all views to manifest a
privacy expectation. Now, however, one sees that potentially very small
holes may negate such expectations. The curtilage doctrine has therefore
effectively, though not expressly, been abandoned as a determinative fac-
tor in the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment in aerial sur-
veillance cases.
The Riley Court does leave room for reviving the curtilage doctrine.
The prospective limiting of the holding to situations where no "intimate
details" were viewed during the surveillance, 199 with an expansive defini-
tion'of the as yet undefined "intimate details," restores protection to the
curtilage by protecting activities within it. The breadth of the definition
that lower courts attach to "intimate details" remains to be seen, but to
remain faithful to the traditional scope of fourth amendment protections,
an expansive definition seems quite appropriate. Any activity reasonably
susceptible of involving personal privacy interests should likely be pro-
tected. That is, any activity that- could be performed in a manner tradi-
tionally believed "private' ought to receive protection. One must keep in
mind that the Framers, in drafting the Fourth Amendment, attempted to
bar an intrusive government. With the rapidly decreasing judicial pro-
tection of this goal in aerial surveillance cases, any reasonably broad in-
terpretation of the Court's opinion that is possible should be entertained.
To do otherwise is to satisfy oneself that the Fourth Amendment can be
cut back in the name of some governmentally designated "noble cause,"
such as the "war on drugs." The rights granted by the Fourth Amend-
ment were not designed to yield to governmentally designated causes. In
fact, fear of government intrusion into private lives motivated the Fourth
Amendment's original adoption.
The second question likely to arise regards who bears the burden of
proof for showing the reasonableness of the privacy expectation.
Although several justices differ as to which party they would allocate the
burden, Justice O'Connor's assignment to the proponent of the motion to
suppress (defendant) seems the most forceful in light of past prece-
dent.z' ° Justice Brennan's burden assignment to the government is well-
reasoned, both due to the state's greater access to customary flight pat-
197. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
198. See supra notes 48-49, infra notes 207-209 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the problems that arise under this type of standard.
199. See supra notes 171-175 and accompanying text for a full discussion of this limitation
on the holding.
200. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
754
FLORIDA v. RILEY
tern information and the fact that "it is unclear whether the prosecution
is a product of an unconstitutional, warrantless search."2"1 His argu-
ment might in fact persuade a lower court that is concerned with policy
and practicality questions of burden of proof allocation. His allocation
best aids the "truth seeking" process regarding reasonableness of privacy
expectations, and simultaneously serves the personal liberty goals of the
Fourth Amendment. Forcing the government to show that defendant's
privacy expectation was unjustified may serve as a deterrent to warrant-
less government invasion in the first place. However, neither his opinion
nor Justice Blackmun's discusses the prior cases imposing-the burden on
the defendant.2"2 Following Riley, it would appear that Justice
O'Connor's view prevails under stare decisis-defendant will likely have
the burden of proof to show his or her expectation of privacy was
reasonable.
Also left undecided is the question whether FAA standards are
proper for measuring the reasonableness of an individual's privacy expec-
tation. The plurality effectively says yes, despite its disclaimer.20 3 The
other five justices, however, reject such a standard, implying that mere
legal positioning may not be sufficient to defeat a Katz reasonable expec-
tation of privacy claim for curtilage observed. But, the composition of
the current court, as well as the disposition of the Riley case without
remand, effectively places the entire Katz standard of the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy from warrantless aerial surveillance in doubt. The
court neither made the proper inquiry under Katz's second prong nor
sought proof (via remand) of the crucial information for such inquiry.
One must therefore conclude, under Riley, that compliance with FAA
regulations possesses more than "obvious importance"2°4 in defeating a
reasonable privacy expectation claim.
As subsequent cases implement the Riley decision, fourth amend-
ment protections are jeopardized. As technology improves, or more-sim-
ply as police switch to helicopters for aerial surveillance,20 5 the limits on
warranfless aerial surveillance will continue to descend to the "undue"
noise, wind, dust, or threat of injury limits. It is doubtful that lower
courts will agree on the conditions that meet those criteria. As technol-
ogy advances even further, as at least Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens believe it may, the Riley limits on aerial surveillance could be-
201. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 704 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
202. See supra note 195.
203. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 697 (plurality opinion); see supra notes 157-60 and accompanying
text.
204. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 697 (plurality opinion).
205. More likely now due to their apparently greater constitutionial surveillance rights
under Riley.
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come altogether meaningless.2"6
VI. Conclusion
The Court would do well to recognize the problems of its approach
to aerial surveillance cases. The Court should retreat from its "not all
views are thereby foreclosed" standard2 "7 as not in keeping with the nec-
essarily broad construction of the Fourth Amendment as a protector of
individuals' security interests, and listen to itself2 °0 as well as the lower
courts.2"o The better standards for evaluating fourth amendment protec-
tions, in light of the Framers' desire to protect personal liberty and secur-
ity, revolve around a "ground-level" approach to the physical
manifestation requirement of the subjective privacy expectation, or at
least a standard of "reasonableness" in taking steps to block aerial
observation.
The Court's broad interpretation of Ciraolo and the resultant nar-
rowing of fourth amendment protections against warrantless aerial sur-
veillance in Riley lead to a time in which the government can, and will,
be able to fly low and unobtrusively, looking down on an individual's
private activities. Such constriction of the rights guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment are the realization of the concerns of the Supreme
206. For example, police may implement a single-person rocket pack which does not pro-
duce "undue" noise, wind, dust, or threat of injury. Fourth amendment protection, hinging on
individual privacy expectations, cannot be permitted to turn on such technological advances.
207. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227 (1986).
208. The Supreme Court itself, in Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 236, stated, "it could
hardly be expected that Dow would erect a huge cover over a 2000-acre tract [to manifest its
subjective expectation of privacy]." It is then disingenuous to find no reasonable expectation
of privacy unless virtually all views are foreclosedl
209. See generally Dean v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 116,
110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1973) ("Horizontal extensions of the occupant's terrestrial activity
form a more realistic and reliable measure of privacy than the vertical dimension of altitude.");
People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 382-83, 710 P.2d 299, 305, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 505 (1985)
(fourth amendment rights to be free from warrantless searches are not waived simply because
all views are not blocked or because the public may occasionally glance down); People v. Sabo,
185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (observation unconstitutional because of legitimate
attempt to block aerial views), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1058 (1986); United States v. Cuevas-
Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987) (surveillance from positions not normally used by the
public violates reasonable privacy expectations); Dow Chemical Co., 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1365
(E.D. Mich. 1982) ("This court is not prepared to conclude that ... Dow must build a dome
over... [its property] before it can be said to have manifested... an expectation of privacy.");
Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 636-37, 511 P.2d 33, 41, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 593
(1973):
Surely our state and federal Constitutions and the cases interpreting them foreclose a
regression into an Orwellian society in which a citizen, in order to preserve a modi-
cum of privacy, would be compelled to encase himself in a light-tight, air-proof box.
The shadow of 1984 has fortunately not yet fallen upon us.
Court over 100 years ago, in Boyd v. United States.21° That Court wisely
recognized that the Fourth Amendment must be interpreted broadly, to
avoid continued narrowing of its protections. "A close and literal con-
struction, deprives [constitutional provisions for the security of persons
and property] of half their efficacy, and leads to a gradual depreciation of
the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance." 2 1' The
current Supreme Court would do well to listen to the voices of its own
past, and stop the Orwellian prophecy212 before it drops out of the sky
upon us all.
By Jon Gavenman*
210. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
211. Id. at 635.
212. See supra note 4; Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 511 P.2d 33, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 585 (1973).
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